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Mexico’s Second Empire (1864-1867), the three year-long government of 
Austrian Archduke Maximilian von Hapsburg, supported by French troops, snags 
at the smooth pattern of the traditional patriotic narrative. The Republic’s 
triumph over monarchism and imperialism is the culminating moment in a story 
that tells of the heroic construction of the nation. In 1867, liberalism, patriotism 
and progress vanquished the legacies of colonialism and the evils of 
Conservative ambition and foreign encroachment. Despite all this patriotic 
fanfare, ambiguity surrounds the tragic figure of Emperor Maximilian. Young, 
some say handsome, and romantic, the emperor and his wife have consistently 
aroused interest and sympathy among a Mexican public with an apparently 
inexhaustible appetite for all things dealing with their melodramatic lives, from 
serious biographies to telenovelas. The striking and widespread images of 
Maximilian’s death have, since 1867, provoked pangs of guilt and long-winded 
efforts to justify and legitimate his execution, and to separate the Austrian 
archduke from the misguided schemes of the Mexican traitors and European 
aggressors who brought him to Mexico.1  
Saving Maximilian from villain status has implied stressing how 
incompatible his personality and ideology were with those who promoted the 
                                                        
 
I am grateful to the Institute for the Study of the Americas, and to Deborah Toner, for having 
invited me to participate in this stimulating workshop. 
1 See, among many others, some of the first of such endeavors: Causa de Fernando Maximiliano de 
Habsburgo, que se ha titulado emperador de México, y sus llamados generales Miguel Miramón y 
Tomás Mejía…, México: T.F. Neve, impresor,  1868; Manifiesto justificativo de los castigos 
nacionales en Querétaro, México: Imprenta de Díaz de León y Santiago White, 1868; and Juan de 
Dios Arias, Reseña histórica de la formación y operaciones del cuerpo del ejército del norte durante 
la intervención francesa: sitio de Querétaro y noticias oficiales sobre la captura de Maximiliano, su 
proceso íntegro y su muerte, México: Nabor Chávez, 1867. 
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“Mexican adventure” on either side to the Atlantic: an ambitious, devious and 
faithless Louis Napoleon Bonaparte in France; in Mexico a posse of myopic, 
resentful, treasonous, fanatic Conservatives. What is interesting, for the purposes 
of this workshop, is that finding Maximilian good has usually meant classifying 
him as a liberal, all while describing the political project he unwittingly headed—
setting up a monarchical regime ruled by a European prince—as liberalism’s 
exact opposite.  This unsettles the teleology of nationalist history, which has set 
up the epic struggle between Liberalism—progressive, republican and good—
and Conservatism—reactionary, monarchist and evil—as the fundamental 
dynamic of historical development from 1810: liberal insurgentes vs 
conservative realistas to, at least, 1910, and, if one is to believe Jesús Reyes 
Heroles and Lorenzo Meyer, to infinity and beyond.  
The dissonance introduced into patriotic myth by the fuzzy feelings 
inspired the “tragedy of Querétaro” and the implication of a more complicated 
relationship than that of stark opposition between liberalism and monarchy, and 
even conservatism in general, throws light on this narrative’s inherent 
limitations and contradictions. In this paper, we hope to further explore the 
“ambiguous relationship” between liberalism and monarchism in nineteenth 
century Mexico. In revealing the connections that historia patria deemed 
impossible, we hope to probe the role of ideological currents, such as liberalism, 
in nineteenth century politics, and, more broadly, in shaping historical processes. 
 
An Uneven Playing Field. 
 
In an essay commemorating the one hundredth anniversary of republican 
triumph, Edmundo O’Gorman wrote that, at the time of Independence, “the seeds 
of Mexico’s being contained not one, but two different Mexicos, […] two possible 
ways of being”, each originating in “the original constitutions of the two 
Americas”: American republicanism and European monarchism. O’Gorman saw 
the political history of the first fifty years of independence as one of violent 
political mestizaje, as the unforgiving struggle between two equally dynamic and 
legitimate political options, as the “immense prestige of the throne and the 
enormous weight of colonial tradition” confronted “the sympathy towards 
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modern democratic tendencies and faith in their excellence as a program for 
better promises in the future”.2 Nevertheless, the clash between these two 
protean forces—encapsulating tradition and modernity, divine right and popular 
sovereignty, the past and the future—so vividly described by O’Gorman, 
becomes blurred in the midst of the tentative, experimental politics of the early 
independent period. Even though Mexico, unlike the rest of Spanish America, did 
experience two monarchical regimes (Agustín de Iturbide’s First Empire, 1822-
1823, and the 1864-1867 government of Maximilian), perhaps the most 
remarkable feature of Mexican monarchism is its inconspicuousness, and the 
defensive, stilted quality of its rhetoric. Except for some exceptional moments 
which we will examine below, monarchy was, until the 1860s, an object of scorn 
and derision, the somewhat embarrassing cause of conspirators and a few Indian 
communities. 
 The fall of Iturbide in 1823 shattered the consensus that had allegedly 
surrounded constitutional monarchy as the ideal form of the government for the 
newborn nation. During the heated constitutional debates of the twenties and 
thirties, despite frequent references to the pervasiveness of colonial habits and 
frames of mind, no politician of substance defended the monarchical option. 
Outside the realm of parliamentary and newspaper politics, very few 
pronunciamientos, such as that of Epigmenio de la Piedra and Carlos Tepisteco 
Abad,3 speak to the remnants of the popular monarchism which colored the 
Insurgency during its early struggles against the viceregal government. In the 
late 1820s, popular demonstrations, virulent pamphlets and alarmed politicians 
denounced a powerful pro-Spanish, monarchical fifth column, but if such a thing 
existed, it took great care not to publicize its opinions, with the possible 
exception of Joaquín Arenas’ 1827 plan to reinstate Fernando VII.4 
 Only in the oppressive political climate of the 1840s did monarchists 
come to the fore. In a context of increasing confrontation with the United States 
                                                        
2 Edmundo O’Gorman, La supervivencia política novohispana. Reflexiones sobre el monarquismo, 
México: Condumex, 1969, pp.12-13. 
3 “Plan de la monarquía indígena proclamado por los curas Dn Carlos Tepisteco Abad y Dn. 
Epigmenio de la Piedra,” February 2, 1834, in Planes en la nación mexicana, once libros, México: 
Cámara de Senadores, 1987, libro II, pp.208-209. 




and growing despair over the possibilities of finding a political solution to 
instability and economic stagnation, the 1836 constitution proved impossible to 
reform, and the 1842 constituent congress debated three constitutions but was 
dissolved before it could agree on one. In 1840, politician and diplomat José 
María Gutiérrez Estrada published a letter to President Anastasio Bustamante, in 
which he called for a national convention to break the stalemate between 
Federalism and Centralism. The Convention, as representative of the sovereign 
people, should have the freedom to discuss all possible forms of government, so 
that it could decide which was best suited to the country’s needs and 
idiosyncrasies. Gutiérrez Estrada then went on to explain why, in his opinion, 
only a constitutional monarchy headed by a foreign prince could save the nation. 
Failing to act decisively at this juncture, he warned, would mean the death of the 
young nation. In a few years “the flag with the American stars” would wave from 
the top of the National Palace, and Protestant services would be held in the 
Cathedral.5 Great outrage met Gutiérrez Estrada’s pamphlet:  journalists and 
congressmen accused him of wanting to turn back the clock, and throw Mexico 
back into the dark ages and into the snare of political dependence. Three days 
after his piece was published, a judge ordered it be confiscated. Gutiérrez 
Estrada would leave the country shortly afterwards, never to return.6 
 In 1846, in the wake of General Mariano Paredes y Arrillaga’s overthrow 
of José Joaquín Herrera’s government, the newspaper El Tiempo called for a 
thorough transformation of the country’s politics by setting up a constitutional 
monarchy. It was published by a group of men led by renowned politician Lucas 
Alamán. Three years later, these pugnacious politicians labeled themselves 
“Conservatives”, and, from the pages of El Universal, denounced the irrationality 
of modern politics. In 1853, they would support the dictatorship of the 
quintessential “hombre imprescindible”, Antonio López de Santa Anna. 
Anticipating the Porfiriato’s “less politics, more administration”, they sought to 
consolidate a strong national government which would guarantee order 
                                                        
5 José María Gutiérrez Estrada, Carta dirigida al Ecsmo Sr. Presidente de la República, sobre la 
necesidad de buscar en una Convención el possible remedio de los males que aquejan a la República; 
y opinions del autor acerca del mismo asunto, México: Ignacio Cumplido, 1840, p.58. 
6 Gabriela Tío Vallejo, “La monarquía en México: historia de desencuentros. El liberalismo 
monárquico de Gutiérrez Estrada”, Secuencia, 30 (Sept-Dec), 1994, pp.33-56. 
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throughout the national territory and foster economic development. They 
established a ministry of development (Fomento) and an Attorney general, but 
also restricted freedom of the press and persecuted its opposition. The project 
expounded by their 1846 paper was, compared to Santa Anna’s last stand, at the 
same time more radical, in that it called for a completely different form of 
government, rather than for the temporary suspension  of the republican rules of 
the game, and more temperate in that it maintained constitutional rule and 
representative politics.  
El Tiempo enjoyed the financial backing of Salvador Bermúdez de Castro, 
Spain’s minister to Mexico, and the sympathies, if not the outright support, of the 
administration.7 The paper promoted Paredes y Arrillaga’s image and his 
policies, which in some cases were authored by Alamán, such as the class-based, 
proportional representation electoral system set up for the designation of the 
1846 constituent congress.8 Like Gutiérrez Estrada in 1840, El Tiempo provoked 
a scandal: in the words of santanista politician, and future Maximilian supporter, 
Antonio de Haro y Tamariz, monarchy meant “regressing three centuries to 
celebrate the entry of Hernán Cortés’ army”.9 A leading liberal daily, El monitor 
constitucional, changed its title to republicano to express its rejection of El 
Tiempo’s dangerous proposals. Again, the effervescence was short-lived: the 
monarchical dispute was soon swallowed up, along with the Paredes y Arrillaga 
regime, by the impending crisis of war against the United States. 
 The brief debates surrounding monarchy during the first half of the 
nineteenth century have the stilted quality of a dialogue between those that 
speak without listening to each other. During the short-lived, exceptional 
moments when the possibility of monarchy was put on the table, its advocates’ 
arguments were quickly drowned out by the patriotic indignation of the press, 
and, in Gutiérrez Estrada’s case, muzzled by judicial injunction. Public 
                                                        
7 Behind the scenes, some of the members of the administration were negotiating to put a 
Spanish prince on a Mexican throne. Nevertheless, it seems that Paredes y Arrillaga never fully 
backed the project. Miguel Soto, La conspiración monárquica en México, 1845-1846, México, 
Ed.Offset, 1988 
8 José Antonio Aguilar, “La convocatoria, las elecciones y el congreso extraordinario de 1846”, en 
Historia mexicana, LXI: 2, 2011, pp.531-588 
9 “Expocisión que Antonio de Haro y Tamariz dirige a sus conciudadanos. Y opiniones del autor 
sobre la monarquía constitucional,”  in Elías Palti, comp., La política del disenso. La “polémica en 
torno al monarquismo” (México, 1848-1850)... y las aporías del liberalismo, México, Fondo de 
Cultura Económica, 1998, p.89. 
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commentators equated monarchy with reaction, the loss of individual rights and 
liberties, and the sacrifice of national sovereignty. Defending such a regime was 
treason, for which there could be no justification. It should then come as no 
surprise, then, that monarchists spent most of their time trying to explain what 
monarchy was not—despotic, backward and harmful to independence—instead 
of spelling out its virtues. This also explains why monarchist politics tended to 
involve not particularly well thought-out conspiratorial activities: the 
negotiations of out-of-work diplomats (Gutiérrez de Estrada, José Hidalgo) or 
exiled clergymen (bishop Pelagio Antonio Labastida y Dávalos) in Europe; the 
flirtations with the Spanish Court by the rickety Paredes y Arrillaga and Santa 
Anna administrations in 1845-1846 and 1854-1855.  
It was only after 1863, in a city occupied by French troops and with the 
republican press stunned and muzzled, that monarchist discourse would have a 
free reign. Mexican monarchism then expressed itself in the hyperbolic, baroque 
prose of Ignacio Aguilar y Marocho’s “Dictamen acerca de la forma de gobierno”, 
with which the Junta de Notables, summoned by the French commander to 
decide on the country’s future, called on Maximilian of Hapsburg to occupy the 
Mexican throne. A monarchical regime would put a stop to the “indescribable 
barbarism” fostered by republicanism, to the long series of 
extortion, violence, injustice, rip-offs, theft, fire and death which are 
the summary of the system set up by the first authorities and the last, 
so that everywhere we could taste the delights of freedom, and be 





El Pájaro Verde would adopt a similar vengeful tone to demand 
punishment for the “demagogues” who in their dangerous political experiments 
had denied the country´s Hispanic, Catholic heritage and risked its ruin. On the 
other hand, the sentimental articles published in La Sociedad hailed monarchy as 
the means to restore harmony between the secular and spiritual powers, without 
which the nation would surely perish, while La Razón explained why the 
imperial regime made sense in what it hoped were the well-reasoned, modern 
arguments of mixed government and the balance of power. Since the fall of 
                                                        
10 “Dictamen acerca de la forma de gobierno,” in Ignacio Aguilar y Marocho, La familia enferma, 
México, Jus, 1969, p.174. 
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Iturbide, monarchy had represented a change so radical, a regime with such 
negative connotations, that its name could not be spoken without contempt. 
During the early years of the Second Empire, monarchy became an artificial 
status quo upheld by restrictive press legislation, which forbade the 
condemnation of the nation’s “elected form of government,” and consequently, 
an empty shell which various factions filled with different contents. 
 
Liberalism and Monarchy. 
Monarchism was, then, in many ways, the odd man out within the Mexican public 
sphere, even before the historians of liberalism’s triumph began using it as 
shorthand for treason, reaction and political imbecility. It could be argued that 
its awkwardness stemmed from its convoluted relationship with independence, 
progress and liberalism, and how monarchists attempted to graft their project 
onto the key, and contested, concepts of nineteenth-century politics. The 1840 
Carta and the 1846 El Tiempo, and even the 1863 “Dictamen”, despite its flowery 
rhetoric redolent of providentialism and paternalism, set forth the advantages of 
constitutional monarchy—“that wondrous invention, unknown to the 
Ancients”11—not as a means to turn back the clock after the upheaval of 
revolution, but as an instrument to make the present more livable. Their explicit 
ideals were the same as those of their opponents: liberty and progress, which 
they nevertheless felt the need to qualify as “true” or “well understood”. Because 
the modern monarchical regime was “independent from party” it would ensure 
stability; because it only sought to create “an aristocracy of merit”, it would bring 
into government the most qualified, and not the most ambitious; because it had 
all sorts of checks and balances built in, through the interaction of representative 
bodies and royal prerogatives, it allowed “the people” to execute all actions that 
were to their benefit, but none that would harm them.12 
Although not particularly democratic, the political positions embraced by 
these men could be described as “liberal”, in that monarchists were committed to 
a “moderate”, balanced, representative government that would protect civil 
liberties. They also stressed the importance of “public opinion”, and, in the 1840 
                                                        
11 Gutiérrez Estrada, Carta, p.90. 
12 Gutiérrez Estrada, Carta, p.90; “Parte política,” El Tiempo, enero 25, 1846. 
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monarchist pamphlet, the unbounded nature of popular sovereignty: if the 
people of Mexico, where “everything”—habits, language, attitudes, memories—
was monarchical,” wanted to set up a throne and invite a foreign prince to sit on 
it, they had every right to do so. In a world in which the belief that natural 
hierarchies and the divine right to rule had been shattered, and political 
legitimacy had become contingent and contentious, they, like those identifying 
themselves as “liberal”, sought to construct a machine for government that 
would “bring together order and liberty”. 
Yet the monarchists’ interlocutors would consistently deny there was 
anything liberal about their proposals. They even failed to acknowledge there 
was anything but bad faith behind them. The monarchists prided themselves on 
being practical men who rejected dogma; as such Gutiérrez Estrada and the 
editors of El Tiempo complained about the narrow-mindedness and political 
intolerance of their “liberal” interlocutors. Blind to the examples furnished by a 
peaceful, prosperous, “civilized” Europe, the republican press shied away from a 
serious discussion of the merits and drawbacks of constitutional monarchy.13 To 
defend his position, Gutiérrez Estrada would even draw on the most radical 
liberals’ arguments for freedom of religion, by stating Mexicans’ need to 
understand that “in politics as in religion, consciences cannot be subjugated by 
the same influences, the same impressions”.14 Furthermore, the politician from 
Campeche insisted that “he had the right to yield before no one as to liberalism”: 
On the other hand, the meaning of that beautiful word, liberal, is 
so elastic! Who would find distasteful to be a liberal with 
Washington or Franklin in America, or with Bailly and so many 
other innocent and glorious victims of the demagogic fury in 
Europe? But, who would not be ashamed to be compared to the 
many who, in both hemispheres have made humanity tremble, 
falsely calling themselves liberal?15 
 
   Conversely, neither the men of El Tiempo, nor those subscribing to the 
1863 “Dictamen,” described themselves as “liberal”, and the latter probably 
would have rejected the label. After the defeat of 1848, the Conservatives 
                                                        
13 “Nuestra profesión de fe al Memorial Histórico,” El Tiempo, febrero 12, 1846. 
14 Gutiérrez Estrada, Carta, p.96 
15 Gutierrez Estrada, Carta, p.91. 
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identified the liberals as “the party of destruction”.16 In the midst of growing 
polarization, sharpened by intransigent opposition to the 1857 constitution and 
the outbreak of civil war, the distance between the two parties grew even wider, 
even if, in the rhetoric of its enemies, “liberal” never acquired the derogatory 
connotations of “demagogue”. But even in times of peace, there seemed to be 
little common ground on which to build a dialogue. 
If, until recently, both contemporary observers and later historians 
disqualified any pretense to liberalism in the proposals articulated by those 
seeking to sell the monarchical project in print, their final, if momentary, 
triumph—Maximilian's regime—has provoked much discussion as to its political 
colors.  It was said, even in the 1860s, that, much to its sponsors’ chagrin, the 
Empire was a liberal regime. There was, of course, the young archduke's explicit 
commitment to "wisely liberal institutions."17 Also, prominent moderate liberals 
collaborated with his government, believing, in the face of the French 
Intervention, that only the Empire could guarantee peace and safeguard “the 
conquests of revolution”.18 More substantive was the emperor’s ratification of 
the Reforma laws, including the nationalization of Church property and religious 
freedom. His and Carlota’s notoriously bad relationship with the Church 
hierarchy, and the emperor’s vision for Church-State relations led the most 
intransigent bishop of all, Michoacán’s Clemente de Jesús Munguía, to look back 
on the Juárez regime with wistfulness.19 Also, in his efforts to reorganize public 
finances, Maximilian called for the election of a Comisión de Hacienda which 
would include representatives of industry, agriculture, mining and commerce 
from each of the empire’s departments, in what Francisco Pimentel, an 
enthusiastic defender of the virtues of private property and free markets, 
described as “an act of liberalism, a solemn you are lying to the superficial men of 
                                                        
16 “Los conservadores y la nación”, El Universal, enero 9, 1850. 
17 “Contestación de Su Alteza Imperial y Real el Archiduque Fernando Maximiliano…” in Boletín 
de las leyes del Imperio, o sea código de la restauración, four volumes, 1863-1865, vol. I, México: 
Imprenta Literaria, p.547. 
18 Juan José Caserta, Jesús López Portillo, Vicente Ortigosa, Antonio Álvarez del Castillo, Rafael 
Jiménez Castro to José López Uraga, Guadalajara, June 4, 1864, in Niceto de Zamacois, Historia de 
Méxio desde los tiempos más remotos hasta nuestros días…, eighteen tomes in twenty volumes, 
Barcelona, México: J.Parres y Cía, 1882, t.XVII, pp.353-356. 
19 Pablo Mijangos, The Lawyer of the Church: Bishop Clemente de Jesús Munguía and the 
Ecclesiastical Response to the Liberal Revolution in Mexico (1810-1866), Thesis (PhD in History), 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2009, pp.268-272. 
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bad faith who […] want the people to believe that monarchy and despotism are 
synonymous”20. Conservative historian, and disenchanted imperialista, Francisco 
de Paula Arrangoiz even blamed the Empire’s failure on the emperor’s 
liberalism, with which he hoped to seduce “liberal Germany” into making him its 
leader. 
Yet, despite the opinions of friend and foe, one would be hard pressed to 
describe as “liberal” a regime with no constitution save the Estatuto provisional 
del Imperio, which determined the administrative structure of the imperial 
government, the characteristics of the national flag, and listed a series of 
“individual guarantees”21. The emperor, “representing National Sovereignty”, 
held both executive and legislative powers. On the ground, the army, much of it 
under foreign command, administered justice and did much of the policing. Even 
if, in the minds of both the imperial couple and the imperialistas, this state of 
affairs was to last only until the State’s affairs could be put in order, the empire’s 
draft constitution, said to have been penned by Carlota herself, did much more to 
strengthen the emperor’s prerogatives than to restrict arbitrary power. The 
Council of State and the Senate, the constitution’s two “intermediary bodies”—
institutions popular among the imperialistas for their moderating influence—
were made up mostly of men close to or designated by the “constitutional” 
emperor. All the members of the Council were to be named by Maximilian, while 
the Senate would include the empire’s dignitaries (princes of the blood, bishops, 
university rectors, members of the High Court, etc.), one hundred members 
chosen by the emperor, and another one hundred elected by the people. The 
Senate would approve bills of law, taxes and budgets, but the emperor could, 
“under extraordinary circumstances”, borrow money without its approval.22   
 
                                                        
20 “Algunos apuntes sobre la Hacienda pública (art.2°)”, La Sociedad, october 28, 1864. The italics 
in the original. Pimentel, a noted man of letters and large landowner, is the autor of La economía 
política aplicada a la propiedad territorial en México (1866). 
21 “Estatuto provisional del Imperio Mexicano”, April 10, 1865, in Tena Ramírez,  Leyes 
fundamentales de México, México: Porrúa, 2002, pp.670-680. 
22 “Constitution de lÉmpire du Mexique”, Bancroft Libray, University of California, Berkeley. 
Jaime del Arenal, “El proyecto de constitución del Segundo Imperio Mexicano: Notas sobre el 
manuscrito de la archiduquesa Carlota”, Susanne Igler, Roland Spiller, eds., Más nuevas del 
imperio. Estudios interdisciplinarios acerca de Carlota de México, Madrid: Iberoamericana, 
Frankfurt: Vervuet, 2001, pp.41-54. 
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Is Liberalism good to think?23 
The debate about the liberal nature of the imperial government and the 
liberalism of its collaborators is open-ended and unresolved. It can also 
sometimes be misleading. The Second Empire's policies towards the Church can 
be taken as a case in point. Describing them as a "third Reform"24, and aligning 
Maximilian with Mora and Gómez Farías, and with Juárez, Ocampo and Lerdo, is 
meant to enhance the former's historical reputation. It nevertheless does little to 
reveal the objectives and assumptions behind the imperial project, or to explain 
the reactions it provoked.  
Maximilian’s Concordat proposal sought not only to consolidate the 
radical reforms of the 1850s (nationalization of Church wealth, a civil registry, 
secularization of graveyards and other public spaces, religious freedom), but to 
revive the colonial patronato and transform all priests into government 
employees, by paying their salaries so that sacraments could be administered for 
free. His initiative was certainly anticlerical, and as such it raised the hackles of 
the Mexican bishops and the papal nuncio. It shared in the regalist ambitions of 
the 1833 reformers, who, although they abolished civil obligation for tithe 
payment, wanted to have a say in the naming of parish priests and the use of 
ecclesiastical wealth. But by hoping to make the Church over into an instrument 
of the State, the emperor and his collaborators clearly sought to go in a different 
direction from that of the embattled Juárez regime who, in 1859, after 
attempting to regulate what it considered were the public aspects of religious 
practice—the administration of justice in civil cases, mortmain property, tariffs 
for religious services—had opted, in the midst of civil war, to separate the two 
entities. Affixing the "liberal" stamp on imperial politics in this case is not 
necessarily wrong, but it obscures and confuses the issue. 
Ascertaining the liberal credentials of nineteenth century political 
expressions has been the preferred endeavor of historians of ideas. Tracing the 
origins and transformations of liberalism and, to a lesser degree, the 
                                                        
23 I am shamelessly plagiarizing Alan Knight’s title, “Is political culture good to think?” in Nils 
Jacobsen, Cristóbal Aljovín, eds., Political culture in the Andes, 1750-1950, Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2005, pp.25-57. 
24 Patricia Galeana, Las relaciones Iglesia-Estado durante el Segundo Imperio, México: UNAM, 
1991. 
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development of resistance to its progress, has for a long time organized 
historical chronology (the chapters on “Militant Liberalism”, and “Liberalism 
triumphant” of El Colegio’s Historia general, for instance) and articulated 
historiographical discussion. It has yielded some impressive results, which in 
many ways constitute the core of what we know about nineteenth-century 
political history.25 But since we are, hopefully, past constructing legitimizing 
genealogies, we can leave behind the controversies set out by Reyes Heroles, Zea 
and Cosío Villegas, which, one could argue, were successfully put to bed by 
Charles Hale. But even when it is not done with the intent to celebrate it, I  would 
like to suggest that calibrating and qualifying “Mexican Liberalism”—and 
inevitably, because we are talking about the periphery, judging how it was 
“received” and usually misinterpreted26—is perhaps not the best way to frame 
our queries about the politics in the past.  
To study liberalism, historians have usually proceeded in three ways. 
Many have analyzed the writings, speeches and actions of politicians, and gone 
over them with a checklist, in order to determine how liberal they were. By 
establishing, usually with great erudition, who these men read and quoted, 
scholars have classified Mexican liberalism according to its “foreign” models. It is 
usually agreed that Mexican liberals fall in with (the decisively inferior brand of) 
French or “Continental” liberals, rather than with those of the Anglo-Saxon 
variety, although US political thought is seldom considered, unless it is mediated 
by Tocqueville, or one is discussing federalism.27 This method, dear to the 
political scientist's heart, yields disappointing results, as it tends to be based on 
relatively rigid, timeless definitions of liberalism as it should have been. Mexican 
                                                        
25 See, among many others, Jesús Reyes Heroles, El liberalismo mexicano, three volumes, México: 
UNAM, 1957; Charles Hale, Mexican Liberalism in the Age of Mora, New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1968; The Transformation of Mexican Liberalism, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1989; Emilio Rabasa and the Survival of Porfirian Liberalism: the man, his career and his ideas, 
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008; Daniel Cosío Villegas et al., Historia moderna de 
México, seven volumes in ten, México: Hermes, 1955-1972.  
26 See, for example, José Antonio Aguilar’s provocative but in the end disappointing Ausentes del 
universo. 
27 Abelardo Villegas, México en el horizonte liberal, México: UNAM, 1981; José Luis Orozco, Sobre 
el orden liberal del mundo, México: MA Porrúa, 1995.  
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Liberalism, then, in a country that is too “Latin”, too Catholic, too “Indian”, too 
backward, is always a watered-down, exotic version of “true” liberalism. 28  
Other historians, such as Charles Hale or Will Fowler, have started out 
with a broader, more flexible vision of liberalism, grounded on historical 
experience. They have consequently spent more time exploring what Mexican 
politicians said and did, and their reasons for doing so, than measuring the 
distance separating them from the “real” liberals living in Europe. In doing so, 
they have revealed the complex and varied ideological and juridical traditions 
from which Mexican politicians drew selectively and they have identified the 
problems which, in a post-revolutionary context, structured political debate. 
They have also shown that these men were in the business of politics, and not of 
producing coherent, theoretically sound political doctrine. However, in 
acknowledging that most Mexican politicians were liberal, they have diluted the 
ideological component of the nineteenth century’s political disputes, without 
necessarily replacing it with something else.  With everyone being liberal, 
political conflict—which included a bloody, protracted civil war—becomes more 
difficult to explain.  
Along the same line, other scholars, including Antonio Annino, Guy 
Thomson, and Florencia Mallon, have focused on the enthusiastic embrace by 
peasant communities and popular urban groups of certain aspects of liberal 
discourse and practice, such as elections and municipal autonomy,29 and on the 
construction of alliances, in the midst of civil and international war, among 
national political factions and rural populations30. “Popular liberalism” has thus 
become one of nineteenth-century historiography’s most fertile paradigms. But it 
is problematic; even as it provided a common ground and a shared language, and 
often fostered the transformation of civic and religious ritual and social 
                                                        
28 Fernando Escalante Gonzalbo, “La imposibilidad del liberalismo en México”, in Recepción y 
transformación del liberalismo en México: homenaje al profesor Charles A. Hale, México: El Colegio 
de México, 1999, pp.13-18. 
29 Richard Warren, Vagrants and Citizens. Politics and the Masses in Mexico City from Colony to 
Republic, Lanham: SR Books, 2001; Antonio Annino, “Cádiz y la revolución territorial de los 
pueblos”, in Annino, coord., Historia de las elecciones en Iberoamérica, siglo XIX. La formación del 
espacio político nacional, Buenos Aires: FCE, 1995. 
30 Guy Thomson, Patriotism, Politics and Popular Liberalism in Mexico. Juan Francisco Lucas and 
the Puebla Sierra, Wilmington: SR, 1999; Florencia Mallon, Peasant and Nation. The Making of 
Post-colonial Mexico and Peru, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995; Peter Guardino, 
Peasants, Politics and the formation of Mexico’s National State: Guerrero 1800-1857, Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1996. 
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organization, popular liberalism could also, depending on particular 
circumstances, reinforce the most traditional social and political patterns.31 With 
little work having been done to compare and contrast the different versions of 
“popular liberalism,” or on “popular conservatism,” the logic with which the 
ideologies of national factions were weaved into village politics and visions of 
moral economy remains unclear.  
In gauging, as does much of the literature, the “liberal” nature of a 
particular political expressions in nineteenth-century Mexico (like in discussing 
if the American Revolution was “liberal” or “republican”) there seems to be no 
wrong answer. This does not bode well for liberalism as an analytical category. 
But is it to be put aside as an obsolete tool, like “Providence”, “national 
character” or “modernization theory”? The challenge posed by this workshop—
to examine the “antagonistic, co-existent and co-operative” relationships 
between monarchy and liberalism—helps illuminate why liberalism is 
something that is still worth thinking about. What do the allegedly implausible 
links between monarchy and liberalism tell us about nineteenth-century politics?   
Drawing from the work of “intellectual”, “ideological” and “conceptual” 
historians,32 we can suggest that the stilted quality of monarchist rhetoric speaks 
to the particular shape of the Mexican (perhaps of the “American”) public sphere, 
which was, apparently, a market place for certain, but not all, ideas. As Gutiérrez 
Estrada’s frustration at being excluded from the charmed circle of liberalism 
illustrates, this implies that the weight and currency of political creeds and of 
concrete proposals have less to do with their doctrinal affiliation, or with the 
soundness of the proponents’ arguments, than with something else. Viability 
comes to mind first, when, for instance, one thinks of what it would have taken to 
identify twelve youths who could “competently prove” that they were descended 
from Moctezuma, as was called for in the 1835 plan for an Indian monarchy.33 
Similarly, realism was not the distinguishing characteristic of Gutiérrez Estrada’s 
lonely quest for a European prince to govern a country too stubborn to realize it 
                                                        
31 Patrick J. McNamara, Sons of the Sierra. Juárez, Díaz and the People of Ixtlán, Oaxaca. 1855-1920, 
Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007. 
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needed one… until he ran into Napoleon III in the midst of the American Civil 
War.  
But feasibility can be the unexpected product of changing circumstances, 
as is shown by what the author of the 1863 “Dictamen” described as a “series of 
admirable events that led to the coming of Mexico’s Second Empire. We 
nevertheless still need to determine why, in the context of confrontation and 
negotiation that is politics, some fared better that others in turning ideas into 
law. From this perspective, Liberalism looks less like a cause than a factor. 
Perhaps, then, we should not think of “liberalism” as a category, engendered by 
the taxonomic impulse of contemporary social sciences today, or as the 
unambiguous principles or easy-to-read roadmaps that should have guided 
yesterday’s politicians, but as a repertoire of challenging problems, which the 
architects of modern politics had to take on: guaranteeing “liberty” and “rights”; 
revealing and complying with “popular sovereignty”; constructing “political 
representation” and “democracy”.34 Rather than gauge how the men of the 
nineteenth century measured up to an ideal liberal standard, we could study 
their proposals, and throw light on the characteristics of the space in which they 
had to maneuver, on the context that both gave meaning to their words and 
actions, and was shaped by them.  
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